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Changing role of local institutions to enable individual and collective
actions for adapting to climate change
Abstract

Studies and practices on commons have demonstrated that local institutions can develop institutional
arrangements to manage resources such as forests and water and can ensure benefit sharing mechanisms in a
sustainable and equitable way. The characters, functions and roles of local institutions required to manage
commons are well studied and translated in practice. Few researchers have reported on the role of local
institutions in adaptation to climate change and variability with little known about key characters and
functions reqUired. This article is based on a case study research in the mountains of Nepal following a mixed
method approach including in-depth interviews of various stakeholders, focus group discussions and
household survey with rural community members of different well-being groups affiliated with Community
Forest User Groups (CFUGs). The research examines the impacts of climate change on livelihoods of poor
and potential of local institutions to enable local communities in individual and collective actions for climate
change adaptation in the mountains of Nepal. The research further explores the mandate, role, functions and
capacity of the CFUG, as one of the major local institutions in Nepal, and presents key characters and
functions required to facilitate climate change adaptation. The research reveals that secure rights over
resources, enhanced capacity, improved governance and support mechanisms, and a critical mass of poor as
key factors to optimize the role of CFUG in pro-poor adaptation in the context of climate change and
variability. The article stimulates a discussion around changing role of local institutions for pro-poor
adaptation in the context of ongoing power relations and social hierarchy in Nepal.
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A reflection on the role of community forest user groups to enable
vulnerable communities to adapt to climate change in Nepal
Popular Gentle1, Rik Thwaites2, Digby Race3, Kim Alexander4
ABSTRACT
In Nepal, community forest user groups (CFUGs) as local institutions have
demonstrated appropriate institutional arrangements to manage forest resources as
commons. The characteristics, functions and roles of CFUGs required to manage
commons are well studied and have been translated into practice. Less is known
about the role of CFUGs, as local institutions, in managing local adaptation to climate
change and climate variability, particularly the key characteristics and functions
required to support vulnerable communities. Case study research on the issues of
development of adaptation strategies by CFUGs and villagers of differing well-being
groups in the mountains of Nepal is reported through qualitative and quantitative
research methods.
This research examines the role and potential of CFUGs as key local institution to
enable vulnerable communities, individually or as a collective to promote actions for
climate change adaptation in the rural hills of Nepal. Of interest are the mandates,
roles, functions and capacity of CFUGs required to facilitate climate change
adaptation to assist the most vulnerable communities. The research identifies that
improved governance, enhanced capacity, knowledge and skills in mediating
external services, and support mechanisms in knowledge and information are key
factors to optimize the role of CFUGs in adaptation to climate change. More
importantly, the research suggests that the success of CFUGs to assist the most
vulnerable in communities depends largely on institutional ability to transform
organizational policies, structure and practices, and delegate authority and power.
These actions are pathways to build trust, empower, engage and allow the most
vulnerable populations to use their rights to an equitable share of the productivity of
the commons.
Key words: Local institutions, community forest user groups, collective actions,
common, climate change, adaptation, vulnerable, Nepal
1. INTRODUCTION
The role of local institutions in managing common pool resources has been a topic of
research interest since the 1980s (Berkes 1989; Ostrom 1990, 2010). Studies on
the use and distribution of resources of the commons indicate that local resource
users develop institutional arrangements to collectively manage resources such as
1,2,3,4
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forests, fisheries, grazing lands and water systems and share benefits derived from
resource management (Agrawal et al. 2013; Agrawal and Yadama 1997; Baland and
Platteau 1996; Kellert et al. 2000; Ostrom 1992; Pretty and Ward 2001). Studies
have also revealed that ineffective institutional arrangements can result in under or
over exploitation of common pool resources (Clark 1973; Larson and Bromley 1990).
Ostrom (2005) has shown that resource dependent communities often develop
institutional rules to define their resource boundaries, user rights, resource allocation
rules, monitoring arrangements, and conflict resolution mechanisms to regulate and
manage common pool resources.
Resource dependent communities are historically experienced in managing weatherdependent natural resources and have developed various adaptation practices to
reduce their risks and vulnerabilities (Adger 2003; Agrawal 2001; Alexander et al.
2010). However, coping and adaptation strategies applied by local communities may
not be adequate due to lack of information, knowledge and resources in the face of
increasing climate change induced vulnerabilities of livelihoods of resource
dependent communities. Climate change has implications for natural resource based
livelihoods and the projected risks are more profound where livelihoods of
communities are primarily dependent on weather sensitive natural resources (IISD
2003; Paavola and Adger 2002; Smit et al. 2007). The roles of local institutions thus
become more important in responding to the impacts of climate change and in
supporting local communities to enhance their adaptive capacity at individual,
household and community levels (Agrawal 2010; Ostrom 2010). According to Adger
(2003), adaptation is a dynamic social process and the ability of societies to adapt is
determined, in part, by the ability to act collectively. Adger (1999) differentiates
individual and collective vulnerabilities with their causes and indicators, listing the
causes of individual vulnerability as relative and absolute poverty, entitlement failure
and resource dependency; and of collective vulnerability as infrastructure
development, institutional and political factors, insurance and formal and informal
social security.
The role of local institutions has been considered very important in climate change
adaptation as local institutions can influence the distribution of climate risk by
organizing incentives for household and community level adaptations, and by
mediating external interventions suited to the local context (Agrawal 2010). Local
institutions contribute to communities’ ability to cope with the risks of climate change
by facilitating and managing the interactions between social and natural capital
(Adger et al. 2003; Pretty and Ward 2001). There are many examples of rural
communities that have acted to enhance their adaptive capacity and organized
collectively to manage climate risks using local institutions in the form of social
networks, capital, norms and traditions (Adger 2003; Pelling and High 2005; RodimaTaylor et al. 2011). Adger (2003) has shown that collective actions such as the
formation and functioning of social networks are linked with adaptive capacity as
collective actions can mediate collective risks in the face of climate change.
The role of local institutions in Nepal has been well recognized in the literature
because of their active role in managing the country’s most important natural
resources such as forests and water as common pool resources (Adhikari and Di
Falco 2009; Lim et al. 2005; Ostrom 1990). Local institutions such as CFUGs and
irrigation groups have been recognized for their potential roles in the implementation
2

of adaptation plans at the local level (MoE 2010; Pokharel and Byrne 2009). One of
the most widespread and well-established local institutions in rural Nepal are
CFUGs. There are currently over 17,500 CFUGs as local institutions managing
approximately 1.65 million ha of community forests (out of total 5.8 million ha)
mobilizing 2.1 million households (about 40% of total and over 60% of rural
population) in Nepal (DoF 2011). The CFUGs have a progressive mandate and
would appear to have the potential to contribute to climate change adaptation by
providing ecological goods and services, socio-economic benefits and a ‘safety net’
for poor people (Pokharel and Byrne 2009).
The role, capacity and functions of CFUGs in Nepal that would enable vulnerable
communities to adapt to climate change are not fully understood. There are also
limitations and concerns about the role and commitment of these institutions in
addressing contemporary issues related to governance (such as equity,
transparency, inclusion and participation), gender and poverty (Gentle et al. 2007;
Kanel 2008; Nightingale 2002; Paudel et al. 2010; Thoms 2008). Rural poor who
depend on natural resources are considered the most vulnerable to climate change
impacts (Agrawal and Perrin 2008; IPCC 2007; Paavola and Adger 2006). Thus
there is a strong need and justification to support poor and vulnerable communities
to improve livelihoods and enhance their adaptive capacity (Gentle and Maraseni
2012; Moser 2010; Vernon 2008). However, it is questionable whether the CFUGs,
often dominated and controlled by local elites (e.g. well-off, upper caste, men), are
prepared to support poor and vulnerable communities in providing measures to
adapt to climate change.
Based on these understandings of the roles and capacities, the research reflects on
the roles, functions and characteristics of CFUGs in the context of climate change
adaptation. Moreover, the research considers changes to CFUGs that may enhance
their effectiveness in supporting the most vulnerable communities for climate change
adaptation. The following sections present a theoretical background of institutions
and their role in the context of climate change, a description of the research site and
methodology applied, key results, discussion and conclusions.
2. INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR ROLE IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION
2.1 Institutions and institutional theories
Discussion of ‘institutions’ emerged in the social and political sphere in the eighties
mostly to define and explain formal institutions. North (1994, 360) defined institutions
as “humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up
of formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (e.g.,
norms of behaviour, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their
enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of societies
and specifically economies”. Similarly, Bromley (1989, 22) defined institutions as
“rules and conventions of society that facilitate coordination among people regarding
their behaviour”. Institutions can be formal or informal and exist at multiple scales of
human organization. Collective management of environmental goods and services
as common pool resources requires institutions in the form of rules, structures,
norms and values (Ostrom 1990; Vatn 2009).
3

The term “institution” covers a broad range of social structures including public, civic
and private sector and at different scales such as local and national (Agrawal and
Perrin 2008; Uphoff et al. 2006). Public institutions include government agencies with
legal authority that can impose penalties or sanctions backed by governmental
powers of enforcement. Civic institutions are membership based cooperatives or
volunteer organizations whose actions are to serve the common interest of their
members in areas such as pooling and mobilizing products, access to capital, labour
needs and other factors of production. Private institutions can include both profit and
non-profit based organizations such as charities, trusts, foundations and market
organizations.
2.2 Local institutions and collective actions
Scott and Marshall (2009) define collective action as an ‘‘action taken by a group
(either directly or on its behalf through an organization) in pursuit of members’
perceived shared interests’’. Collective actions are volunteer actions such as
collective decision-making, setting rules to conduct and manage a group,
implementing decisions, and monitoring adherence to rules (Meinzen-Dick et al.
2004). According to Poteete and Ostrom (2004) collective actions emerge and grow
in the forms of formation and development of institutions, mobilization of resources,
co-ordinate activities and information sharing.
Collective actions occur through involvement of a group of people with a shared
interest and generally involve common action driven by shared interest (MeinzenDick and Di Gregorio 2004). Collective action enhances coordination, organization,
and mobilization of individuals and groups to achieve a common goal and produce
collective and effective outcomes (Ostrom 1990). Collective actions also occur in
instances of state and market failures, particularly in meeting the needs of the poor
in agricultural and rural development (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004). In Nepal, evidence
of collective actions is observed through various group activities and programs such
as forest user groups, microfinance groups, watershed management programs,
integrated pest management, participatory breeding and farmer-managed irrigation
systems.
2.3 Effectiveness of local institutions in managing commons
Environmental and resource regimes provide examples of common institutions that
can regulate actions against environmental degradation either through restriction on
over-exploitation of resources or reducing unintended side effects of resource
exploitation (Young 2010). The characteristics, functions and roles of common pool
resource management institutions related to irrigation, forestry, fisheries and
pastures have been widely studied. The concepts and practices of self organization
amongst resource users under particular institutional arrangements have been well
established (Cox et al. 2010; Feeny et al. 1990). Most of the studies, innovations
and criticisms are based on theories and principles such as:
i)
ii)

institutional rules (Ostrom 1986, 1990);
underlying factors for effectiveness of collective action (Wade 1988);
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iii)
iv)

design principles for long-enduring and robust institution (Ostrom 1990);
and
facilitating conditions for collective action (Baland and Platteau 1996).

The effectiveness of local institutions has been examined in common pool
management systems. Andersson and Agrawal (2011), examining the relationship
between socio-economic inequalities and ecological sustainability related to forest
commons, found that socio-economic inequalities had negative effects in forest
outcomes; however, such inequalities were found to be significantly reduced where
local institutions were effectively functioning with collective actions. Lam (1998), in a
comparative study of farmer and government-managed irrigation systems in Nepal,
concluded that farmer-managed irrigation systems were performing better than the
government- managed irrigation systems in terms of better ownership, well
established and accepted local rules, and equity in benefit sharing. These examples
well demonstrate the effectiveness of local commons in managing local resources.
2.4 Capacity of local institutions in managing climate change adaptation
According to Agrawal and Perrin (2008) climate change adaptation is a local
process, and its effectiveness depends on local and external institutions through
which incentives for individual and collective actions are defined. This is because
“institutional arrangements structure risks and sensitivity to climate hazards, facilitate
or impede individual and collective responses, and shape the outcomes of such
responses” (Agrawal and Perrin 2008, 8). Institutions play important roles in
influencing livelihoods and adaptations of rural communities in three different ways
as: (i) institutions structure the distribution of climate risks and impacts; (ii)
institutions constitute and organize the incentive structures for household and
community level adaptations for their adaptation responses; and (iii) institutions
mediate external interventions into local contexts which ultimately unfold the
adaptation by articulating social and political process (Agrawal and Perrin 2008).
There are many examples where rural communities have enhanced adaptive
capacity and collectively organized to manage climate risks using their local
institutions in the form of social networks, capital, norms and traditions (Pelling and
High 2005; Rodima-Taylor et al. 2011). The formation and functioning of social
networks are linked with adaptive capacity of the socio-ecological system because
collective actions can mediate collective risks and enhance adaptive capacity to
climate change (Adger 2003). Studies by Adger (2000) and Agrawal (2008) have
highlighted the potential for rural institutions to strengthen the adaptive capacity and
facilitate adaptation to climate change at the local level. Based on studies conducted
in Mexico, Eakin (2005) argues farmers’ sensitivity to climatic impacts and their
capacity to manage climatic risk mainly depends on how they organize their
livelihoods in confronting institutional change. Robledo et al., (2004) have shown
how community organizations in hill communities in Bolivia remained successful in
developing adaptation strategies and building resilience through ecosystem
management and restoration activities including rehabilitation of watersheds, agroecology, and forest landscape. Moser (1996) and Narayan-Parker (1997) have
argued that communities associated with social networks and civic associations are
more likely to cope successfully with adverse situations caused by climate change.
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2.5 Limitations of CFUGs in managing common pool resources
The inclusion and participation of marginalized community members such as poor,
women and Dalits2 and their access to equitable benefit sharing from common pool
resource management in Nepal is questioned and criticized by several authors
(Acharya and Gentle 2005; Adhikari and Di Falco 2009; Hughes 1993; Kanel 2008;
Tiwary 2006). The patriarchal social structure and historically constructed power
relations were found to be a major cause for exclusion of women in collective actions
in South Asia (Agarwal 2010). Adhikari and Di Falco (2009) explored the role of
social heterogeneity in the participation of households in decision making positions in
community forestry (CF) in Nepal, finding that, members of households belonging to
lower-caste groups had a lower probability of being elected as members of the
executive committee of user groups. Poverty and powerlessness in Nepal historically
depends on caste, gender, ethnicity and geographical location of people (Bennett et
al. 2006; CBS 2011). The issues related to inequality and discrimination, nonparticipation, disempowerment, and lack of accountability are also considered to
diminish core human rights (Evans 2009).
The disparity in socio-economic outcomes of community forestry has been analyzed
in a study of 1,788 CFUGs from 12 middle hill and Terai districts of Nepal (Kanel
2004). The study found that the total annual income of CFUGs in Nepal in 2004 was
about 10 million USD, however, only about 3% of this went to specifically pro-poor
investments, in comparisons to expenditures in other areas such as community
development (36%), forest development (28%), miscellaneous (17%) and CFUG
operational expenses (14%). Another study of eight CFUGs in Nepal revealed that
the economic activities or commercialization of community forestry was not pro-poor
with unequal distribution of the funds among community households (Paudel et al.
2010). Studies by Paudel et al., (2006) and Paudel et al., (2010) also confirmed that
association between CFUG members, contractors and forestry officials promoted
and institutionalized corruption in the CFUGs following commercialization of forest
products. Corruption is common in Nepal as the country has been ranked at 139th
position in the Transparency International global corruption index (TI, 2012).
Realizing these socio-economic disparities and equity issues, the community forestry
guideline was revised in 2009 (GoN 2009) including provisions for participation,
decision making and benefit sharing to assist pro-poor affirmative actions.
3. RESEARCH LOCATION AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Research location
Case study research was conducted in the Lamjung district of Nepal. The district is
located in the middle hills region of western Nepal. The population of the district in
2011 was 169,104 in 44,068 households (GoN 2012). The district is representative
2

Dalits are occupational caste groups considered as untouchables and so called low caste group in
South Asia.
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of the middle hill region of Nepal where over two thirds of the population of the
district depends on subsistence agriculture with a strong linkage between farming,
pasture lands and forestry. The district is ranked as one of the very high climate
change vulnerable districts in Nepal based on high vulnerabilities due to landslides
and glacial lake outburst floods (GLOF) (MoE 2010). The population of the district is
diverse in terms of caste (including Dalit and other castes), culture and indigenous
ethnic identity (such as Gurung, Magar, and Tamang). Table 1 presents a description
of CFUGs selected for case study.
Table 1 Description of CFUGs selected for research
Name of the
CFUG
Kataharbari

Raniswanra
Sankharpakha
Chisapani

Manasalu

Major caste
and
ethnicity
Bahun,
Chhetri,
Dalits
Bahun,
Chhetri,
Dalits
Bahun,
Chhetri,
Gurung,
Dalits
Gurung,
Dalits

Location
Village (VDC)

Altitude
(meter)

Number of
households

Area of
CF (ha)

Tarkughat
(downstream)

< 500

80

22.40

Year CF
handed
over
1995

Archalbot
(downstream)

< 500

130

54.17

1996

Bahundanda
(upstream)

> 1,000

60

34.81

2005

Ghermu
(upstream)

> 1,000

120

97.80

2003

Source: DFO and CFUG records

The forests in this district complement agricultural practices by providing forest
products, grazing land, environmental services to stabilize land, and to regulate
water resources (DFO 2012). Approximately 39% of the total area of the district is
covered by forests (total area = 170,781.6 ha) and about 19,319 ha forest area of the
district has been handed over to 24,904 households affiliated with 304 CFUGs as a
community forest (DFO 2012). The remainder of the forests in the district is either
managed by the government or by the Annapurna Conservation Area Project. The
research was conducted in four village development committees (VDCs) of the
district, two from downstream (altitude below 500 m) and two from upstream region
with altitude above 1000 m along the Marsyangdi River. Four CFUGs were selected
as research sites representing one each from selected VDCs.
3.2 Research methods
The research followed a mixed method approach based on pragmatism using an
interpretivist perspective (Johnson et al. 2007; Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003). The
inductive theory followed by a deductive theory was combined considering qualitative
methods as dominant and quantitative methods as complementary methods of data
collection (Creswell 1994; McMurray et al. 2004). Qualitative methods provided the
primary data collection techniques, including in-depth interviews (n=62 community
and district level interviewees), focus group discussions (FGDs) (n=11 events and
117 participants from community level) and participant observations. Complementary
quantitative data was gathered through a household level survey (n=133 community
level respondents). Participatory well-being ranking was conducted in all research
7

sites to categorize the research population into four well-being strata (well-off,
medium, poor and very poor) based on relative well-being position of households in
the community using local criteria of well-being (Mosse 1994). Survey respondents
and interviewees were selected representing all well-being groups using stratified
random sampling process. Quantitative data was analyzed using SPSS 17 and the
qualitative data was analyzed through a thematic hierarchical approach using NViVO
9.
4. RESULTS
4.1 CFUGs and their contribution in climate change adaptation
The research participants (interviewees, household survey respondents and
participants of FGDs) recognized the current role and potential of CFUGs in climate
change adaptation. The CFUGs function in coordination with various formal and
informal local institutions, within the state, civil society and private sectors. Although,
the plans and activities of the CFUGs had no explicit provisions for climate change
adaptation, research participants recognized the useful contribution in enabling
communities in climate change adaptation. The existing knowledge, capacity and
experience of all CFUGs was very low in designing and implementing climate
change related activities and in addressing the needs of local community for climate
change adaptation initiatives. The role and mandate of CFUGs was not explicitly
identified in written policies, however these institutions were willing to enhance their
understanding of climate change and implement adaptation activities to reduce
vulnerability.
Almost all research participants in the communities had an association with CFUGs.
The CFUGs had well established networks with locally governed rules, norms and
values to mobilize local communities and manage common pool resources. The
major roles and functions of the CFUGs to support local communities in climate
change adaptation were highlighted as: (i) income and employment generation; (ii)
protecting and managing forest commons; (iii) supply of forest products and
contribution in rural livelihoods; (iv) environmental services such as protection and
conservation of soil and water resources; (v) income and economic services; (vi)
contribution in infrastructure development and community development activities;
(vii) pro-poor investment and contribution in poverty reduction; (viii) livestock grazing
(ix) awareness raising, capacity building and leveraging social capital, and (x)
supporting communities in disaster risk reduction and emergency relief (Figure 1).
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and reducing
climate sensitivity
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climate change
adaptation

Pro-poor investment &
poverty reduction

Livestock grazing

Strengthening social
capital & capacity

Enhancing adaptive
capacity at
household &
community level

Support in disasters &
emergencies

Figure 1 Ongoing contribution of CFUGs in climate change adaptation and rural
livelihoods (Source: Interview and FGD transcriptions)

4.2 Outreach of CFUGs to vulnerable communities
Participants recognized the important role of CFUGs as local institutions in
mobilizing large number of community members and managing common pool
resources according to locally governed rules. Analysis was carried out of their role,
capacity and willingness to support the most vulnerable communities, exploring
aspects such as membership, decision making, benefit sharing, implementation of
governance related provisions, mediation of external services and benefits, and
satisfaction of communities towards the CFUGs.
For the purposes of this analysis, the communities most vulnerable to climate
change impacts are considered to be those who are poor in terms of their well-being
status and belong to so called lower caste in terms of their social status; and those
living in vulnerable locations prone to landslide and gullies and scarcity of water
(research by the authors, paper in prep.).
4.2.1 Membership
9

Participants reported that the membership of CFUGs was open to all communities
living close to the forests and traditionally depending on forest resources. However,
membership in some CFUGs was restricted to certain caste groups and to the
recently migrated members. One of the major forms of exclusion in CFUG
membership was based on traditional use rights and tenure claimed by certain caste
groups. As explained by the participants of FGD:
“the forest area of Chisapani CFUG was historically under the control of certain
upper caste groups. However, following the private forest nationalization policy
of the government the forest became public property and the land measurement
in 1986 declared the forest as public property. The forest was then handed over
to the local community as a community forest in 2005. However, the local elites
from dominant caste groups decided to provide membership of the CFUG only
to upper caste groups assuming the forest as their ancestral property. The
forest was officially handed over to the upper caste groups and the Dalits who
were also traditionally residing in the same community were excluded from their
membership and user rights. The Dalit communities continuously claimed their
user rights as per the provisions of community forestry. Government officials
also argued that the membership of community forest should be provided to all
households living close to the forests. After some years the community forest
management committee decided to provide membership to excluded
households but they asked 4,000 Rs from each household as membership fees.
Some households paid this amount to become a member but some households
who couldn’t afford this amount are still excluded. The money collected as
membership fees were distributed among upper caste households rather than
depositing it in CFUG account. The decision making of this forest is still
controlled by local elites and decisions are not transparent to other members”.
A poor interviewee from Raniswanra CFUG claimed that she was compelled to pay a
high membership fees while receiving a new membership of Raniswanra CFUG
when she migrated in a village close to the community forest. As she described
“community forest user group is collecting money from new members. The
membership fee for new members is 10,000 Rs. This amount is very high for poor
members.” As reported, many very poor and poor households were not able to get
membership because of high membership fees. The stories explain how traditional
and feudal legacy has been transferred to local institutions and how local elites use
their caste and wealth based power to exclude powerless communities from their
access to membership. As reported by the research participants similar practices
exist in many CFUGs in the district.
4.2.2 Decision making
The household survey data revealed that in 30% of respondent households (total
133) at least one member was in a decision making positions of local institutions.
However, participation in decision making positions was varied according to wellbeing status of the respondents. As reported, 77 % well-off and 24% medium
respondents had at least one household member in decision making positions of
these institutions. While, none of the poor and very poor households were in the
decision making position of those institutions. The Pearson’s chi-square test
indicated that there was a significant relationship between participation of
10

respondents in the decision making positions of institutions with their well-being
status (X2 = 54.5958, df = 3, p-value =0). However, participation of respondents in
decision making positions of local institutions had no significant association with
gender of household head or according to case study site.
Similarly, an analysis of executive committees of the four case study CFUGs,
revealed that the participation of well-off, medium, poor and very poor well-being
groups in the committees in 2012 was 47%, 39%, 11%, and 3% respectively (Table
2). Out of 16 members in the key positions of executive committee, 56% were welloff and 44% were medium, whereas, there was no representation of poor and very
poor households in the key decision making positions such as chairperson, vice
chairperson, secretary and treasurer (Table 2).
Table 2 Participation of different well-being groups in the decision making positions
of CFUGs
Well-being status

Total member
households
of CFUGs

Well-off
Medium
Poor
Very poor
Total numbers
Source: CFUG records

122 (30%)
155 (39%)
82 (20%)
43 (11%)
402

Committee
members

18 (47%)
15 (39%)
4 (11%)
1 (3%)
38

Key positions (Chairperson,
vice chair person, secretary
and treasurer) in the
committee
9 (56%)
7 (44%)
0
0
16

Two examples presented above confirm that the decision making of local institutions
is controlled by local elites based on their well-being status and traditionally gained
power. The decision making authority of these institutions indicates who makes local
rules (and thus holds power and influence), and how these rules affect the members,
as seen in the following sections.
4.2.3 Benefit sharing
Benefit sharing practices of local institutions was analyzed using contribution of
CFUGs in implementing pro-poor provisions. The implementation of pro-poor
provisions mentioned in the revised community forestry guideline was considered as
crucial to increase the adaptive capacity of poor and vulnerable communities. The
guidelines included mandatory provisions to be carried out by all CFUGs as: i) wellbeing ranking of CFUG households according to their relative well-being; ii)
preparation and implementation of livelihood improvement plan for poor households;
iii) allocation of part of the CF land for income generating activities; and iv) allocation
of at least 35% of CFUGs’ income for pro-poor activities. However, an assessment of
the implementation status of pro-poor provisions as per the provision of revised CF
guidelines revealed that the CFUGs were not following most of the provisions.
Although the CFUGs had carried out well-being ranking and mentioned the
outcomes in the constitutions or forest operational plans, the ranking was not used in
deciding benefit sharing provisions (Table 3).
Table 3 Implementation status of pro-poor provisions according to community
forestry guideline
11

Major provisions

Implementation status in different CFUGs
Kataharbari
Yes

Well-being
ranking
of
CFUG
households
No
Preparation and implementation of
livelihood implementation plan
No
Allocation of CF land for income
generating activities of poor
Allocation of at least 35% of CFUG Nominal
amount of
income for pro-poor activities

Raniswanra
Yes
No
No
No

interest free
loan provided
No

No
Declaration
of
kind
and
cash
contribution for poor in the annual plan
Source: Analysis of interview transcriptions, FGDs and CFUG records

Chisapani
Yes
No

Manasalu
Yes
No

No

No

No

No

No

No

In contrast to the pro-poor policy provisions, the well-being ranking and
categorization of households according to well-being status was also opposed by
some more well-off interviewees and FGD participants. As one FGD participant
explained: “we are not in favour of well-being ranking and differential prices of forest
products for different well-being groups... as the rich have to contribute equally in the
CF, the price of forest products should be same for all”. A district level government
official agreed in interview that the policies related to pro-poor resource allocations
were not under implementation: “the provisions of CF guideline are not implemented
in most of the CFUGs in this district. As per the guideline 35% of CF income should
invest on poverty reduction. But it is not happening in this district”. An annual
monitoring report of district forest office mentioned that the allocation of annual
budget for income generation and livelihood improvement activities in 2011 by the
CFUGs in the district was only two percent of annual income about 9.5 million NRs.
The local elites who were in decision making positions of CFUGs had their own
understanding of poverty and poor. The interviewees mentioned that the poor and
Dalits were poor and vulnerable because of their internal reasons and behaviors
such as drinking alcohol, laziness and not being aware and worried about their own
life. The interviewees reported that the local institutions have a limited role in
improving the livelihoods of poor. As shared by one of the interviewees in senior
position of CFUG and other local institutions: “Dalit and poor are poor because of
their own reason and behaviour. They have to know how to utilize and mobilize
resources to get out of poverty”. However, very poor and poor interviewees
described discriminatory practices and exclusion as the major causes pushing them
below poverty and sustaining injustice. So, it seems that while the government
adopts a progressive approach in terms of drafting CF guidelines with pro-poor
provisions, they have not been effective in implementing those policies and
monitoring their implementation status.
4.2.4 Implementation of governance related provisions
The major governance provisions mentioned in the revised CF guidelines were
related to participation of all user group members in decision making process,
transparency in decisions, benefit sharing and financial management, accountability
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of committee members towards weaker sections of CFUG members, and
accountability of District Forest Office (DFO) staff in monitoring of CFUGs. Table 4
presents the implementation status of governance related provisions by CFUGs.
Table 4 Implementation status of governance related provisions according to
community forestry guideline
Implementation status in different CFUGs
Major provisions

Kataharbari

Raniswanra

Chisapani

Manasalu

Proportionate representation of poor,
Dalits, women, indigenous nationalities
in the user committees of CFUG
Inclusion of committee members from all
villages (toles) of CFUG households
Organize public audit by all CFUGs at
least once a year ensuring participation
of poor, Dalit and women.
General assembly of the CFUG should
assign the auditor
Users’ committee is only allowed to
spend money according to the annual
plan approved by general assembly of
users’ group
CFUGs should report to DFO and other
service providers about the progress of
livelihood improvement program.
Committee members are considered as
equivalent to officers bearing public
positions

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Committee
members were
not aware
about the
provision

Committee
members were
not aware about
the provision

Committee
members
were not
aware about
the provision

No

Provided
nominal subsidy
to some poor
households

Committee
members
were not
aware about
the
provision
No

Include poor as a new member either
free of cost or at subsidized membership
fees

No

Source: Analysis of interview transcriptions, FGDs and CFUG records.

The Table above shows that the CFUGs were not successful in implementing most
of the governance related provisions. The only provision implemented by all CFUGs
was the representation of committee members from different clusters or toles of
CFUG households.
The district level interviewees related to forest office agreed that the mandatory
policies such as revised community forestry guideline were not implemented by most
of the CFUGs and the concerned authorities were also not able to implement the
policies. As mentioned by an interviewee from the district forest office:
“Community forestry guideline is not implemented by the groups in this
district....We have 300 community forest user groups in the district and they are
providing services to about 70 percent of the population in the district. Majority
of the community forests are passive. The user groups are only active where
there is an opportunity to get income. The activity of user groups is focused to
grasp benefits. There are only 8-10 CFUGs in the district operating according
to the concept, policy and provisions of community forestry”.
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The same interviewee further mentioned that the governance of community forestry
user groups was very weak and many groups were controlled by certain number of
elites: “40-50 percent CFUGS are run by single man and no other persons than a
single man knows what is happening. 10-20 percent groups are being managed by
4-5 persons. There might be only 10 percent CFUGs where there is participation of
all user group members....In the past, only the government staffs were involved in
corruption but now user group members are also involved in corruption”. The
statement indicates that the government office was not capable enough to control
the elite domination in the community forests and corruption has been further
institutionalized in the society.
4.2.5 Mediation of external services and benefits
One of the major expected roles of CFUGs, in the context of climate change
adaptation, is to mediate external services as per the adaptation needs of local
communities. Interviewees reported that local adaptation needs are multidimensional
in nature and it is only possible to achieve by coordination of services by many
organizations. Interviewees who were in executive committee of CFUGs, reported
that they were able to influence district level government offices, such as forest,
agriculture, women’s development and soil conservation offices for cash and
material support in activities such as landslide control, soil conservation and other
community development activities. Interviewees identified the role of CFUGs in
approaching and influencing district and national NGOs to bring capacity building
and income generating activities to their village.
However, in contrast to this opinion, very poor and poor research participants
claimed that CFUGs as local institutions were even hindering them to get access to
benefits and services provided by government and other organizations. As reported
by a very poor interviewee: “there are many government programs in favour of poor
but the locals don't allow implementing them. The local headmen get benefit, nothing
for poor. It is all for those who can speak, nothing for voiceless”. Another very poor
interviewee explained: “government is providing benefits but we can’t get it in the
village as local institutions don’t support us”. One district level government
interviewee from the forest office stated that the local elites in key positions of local
institutions were limiting the access of government officials to poor households with
pro-poor provisions. As he mentioned: “there is elite domination and poor and
marginalized are expecting the role of government to implement pro-poor provisions.
But the elites have political protection….local elites don’t allow government in
outreaching benefits and services to the poor people”. In contrast to the expected
role of local institutions in influencing external agencies in favor of poor and
vulnerable, the CFUGs were blamed as creating obstacles in outreach and benefits
of services to the poor households. Given the tendency of government and national
and international aid organizations to implement their programs in rural areas
through local institutions as implementing partners, the above analysis identifies a
challenge for external organizations who seek to engage with vulnerable
communities and support their adaptation needs through the platforms of local
institutions such as CFUGs.
4.2.6 Satisfaction with services and functions of CFUGs
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The survey data revealed that over 75% of respondents were very satisfied or
satisfied with the functions and current services of CFUGs. However, 63% of very
poor and about 28% of poor respondents expressed their dissatisfaction with the
functions of CFUGs. The satisfaction of respondents with the current roles and
functions of CFUGs had a significant relationship with their well-being status
(Pearson’s X2 = 83.1444, df =12, p-value = 0) (Table 5).
Table 5 Respondent’s satisfaction with roles and functions of CFUGs
Level of satisfaction

Very satisfied

No. of responses according to well-being groups
Well-off
Medium
Poor
Very
Total (n=133)
(n=38)
(n=50)
(n=29)
poor
(n=16)
25
12
2
0
39 (29 %)

Satisfied
13
31
Neutral
0
3
Not satisfied
0
4
Very dissatisfied
0
0
Source: Analysis of household survey data

17
2
8
0

3
3
7
3

64 (48 %)
8 (6 %)
19 (14 %)
3 (2 %)

Interviewees expressed their satisfaction with the roles and functions of CFUGs was
mainly due to contribution of CFUGs in managing and conserving natural resources
(such as forest, water and soil) and accessing external services for local benefits.
As reported by these interviewees, the efforts were successful in promoting
collective actions and to reduce climate change vulnerability and risks in the
communities. The very poor and poor interviewees who expressed their
dissatisfaction claimed the local institutions that were formed by local elites and welloff for their own interest and the poor had no benefits from the CFUGs. One of the
very poor and Dalit interviewees expressed her frustrations with local institutions as
she realized that benefits from these institutions were always utilized by well-off
households: “I don't have trust with these institutions. Everything is for rich and there
is nothing for poor in this village..... All the local institutions are for those who can
speak. Whatever benefits comes to this village, it is all for those who can speak”.
The local institutions are made by rich people for their own benefit”. There were
many stories of this nature expressed by very poor and poor interviewees. The
frustration expressed by the interviewees was due to various practices and
behaviors of CFUGs such as exclusion in membership, discrimination in benefit
sharing and obstacles in access to services and benefits by poor and vulnerable
communities.
Despite these issues and concerns, very limited efforts were made to improve the
governance and transformation of CFUGs in favor of poor and vulnerable
communities. Most of the persons in the decision making positions had their
connection with political parties and the political connections were also used to gain
power and to continue impunity. As reported by one of the interviewees affiliated with
district level forest office: “the local elites who are in key positions of CFUGs have
political protection. If we do initiate any actions against them the matter goes to
political party leaders”.
Although, the functions of CFUGs were supporting collective actions and somehow
successful in reducing collective vulnerabilities, the actions were not found to be
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effective in reducing individual vulnerabilities, especially in addressing the
vulnerabilities of the most vulnerable population. The exclusion and discrimination of
vulnerable communities from access to and utilization of resources has been
reported as injustice and a violation of human rights by very poor and poor
communities.
4.3 Characteristics and functions required in CFUGs to support most
vulnerable for climate change adaptation
Research participants, in general, recognized that the CFUG could be one of the
potential institutions to enable local communities for climate change adaptation.
However, the interviewees also reported changes required in CFUGs in terms of
institutional characteristics and functions to enable the most vulnerable communities
for climate change adaptation. The reported characteristics and functions are
analyzed in different themes as (i) improved governance; (ii) focus on livelihoods
improvement; (iii) strengthening and leveraging social capital; (iv) contribution in food
security; (v) reducing disaster risks; (vi) external coordination and linkages; (vii) and
secured ownership. Table 6 provides a quantification of the number of responses
under each of these themes, and further categorised for the number of respondents
in different well-being groups.
Table 6 Changes required in CFUGs to enable climate change adaptation
Changes required in CFUGs to
enable pro-poor adaptation

Percentage of responses according to well-being
groups
Well-off
Medium
Poor
Very poor
Total
(n=12)
(n=13)
(n=13)
(n=12)
(n=50)
Improved governance
58
54
46
83
66
Focus on livelihoods improvement
57
38
31
50
46
Strengthening social capital
50
46
23
33
38
Contribution in food security
25
62
38
17
36
Reducing disaster risks
42
23
23
25
28
External coordination and linkages
42
31
8
25
26
Secured ownership
42
0
8
8
14
Source: Analysis of interview transcriptions

Not surprisingly, the proposed changes in characteristics and functions of local
institutions also varied according to the well-being status of the interviewees. Higher
percentages of very poor and poor interviewees were in favour of improved
governance, pro-poor and vulnerable focused policies and programs, and solidarity
and critical mass of poor and vulnerable. On the other hand, the well-off and medium
interviewees had an interest in enhancing institutional knowledge and capacity for
climate change adaptation, external linkage and coordination and disaster risk
reduction and relief activities.
5. DISCUSSION
The role of CFUGs as local institutions were recognized as having potential to
contribute to climate change adaptation, based on their authority, role and mandate
in managing local resources through the mobilization of local communities. Although,
current understanding, knowledge and capacity of the CFUGs was not adequate,
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these institutions had a very high potential in analyzing climate vulnerabilities,
mobilizing local resources and linking local issues to mediate external organizations.
The findings support the crucial role of CFUGs as a local institution supporting local
communities on local level adaptation planning and implementation as highlighted by
previous studies (Agrawal and Perrin 2008).
The knowledge and experience gained by CFUGs in managing common pool
resources could reduce vulnerabilities, disaster risks and enhance adaptation
capacity of local communities. However, most of the contributions were targeted at
reducing collective vulnerabilities of communities with little focus on addressing
individual vulnerabilities of communities, particularly the most vulnerable. As
mentioned in the literature (Adger 1999, 2003), the study showed that individual and
collective vulnerabilities were caused by different factors requiring different strategies
to address individual and collective vulnerabilities.
The poor and most vulnerable communities lacked trust and ownership of CFUGs as
local institutions, largely due to exclusion from membership and decision making,
discrimination in sharing benefits and obstructing and manipulating external services
targeted to vulnerable communities. As reported, the elites in local institutions were
promoting and sustaining caste, gender and class based discriminations and
exclusion of poor and marginalized from access to resources, services and the
benefit sharing system. Local elites were not in favor of delegating authority and
power to poorer community members. Unequal power relations and the continued
dependency of the poor were benefiting local elites and sustaining power
relationships.
The inequity in participation and benefit sharing based on caste, class and gender
has been well reported by authors in the similar context (Adhikari and Di Falco 2009;
Agrawal 2001; Jones and Boyd 2011). Local institutions represent the society and
functions as a sub-set of the society. The discriminatory, exclusive and dominant
practices adopted by the elites in decision making positions of the CFUGs, may not
be formed by CFUGs themselves. Rather the practices are transferred from the
society where such practices exist as a legacy of feudal, patriarchal and caste based
dominations. However, it is not known whether civil society institutions may influence
the society at large to reduce and end such anomalous practices or whether those
practices of local institutions may only be reduced through societal influence.
A general trend was observed that the local institutions such as CFUGs were
increasingly considered as partners of government and donor agencies to implement
their programs in the communities. The constituency of local institutions and their
capacity to mobilize and leverage local resources has been considered as their asset
to achieve the targets of external organizations. This is exhibited by government
recognition of CFUGs as the key implementing agencies of the national adaptation
program of action to climate change (MoE 2010, 21). Although the priorities and
policies of government and donor agencies intend to reach and serve the most
vulnerable groups, this research finds that the most vulnerable groups are in fact not
receiving the intended benefits from the CFUGs. This has an implication for the
ongoing expectations of external agencies of the outcomes of partnerships with
CFUGs as local institutions. Continuation of such partnership without improving and
transforming the structure and governance of CFUGs may further disenfranchise
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poor and vulnerable communities from the benefits of climate change adaptation
initiatives.
The results showed that the poor and vulnerable communities were not able to
exercise core human rights such as equality and non-discrimination, participation
and empowerment, and accountability as guaranteed by international declarations of
human rights (Evans 2009). Civil society organizations often promote and claim
justice and human rights of citizens. However, how the members of local institutions
such as CFUGs claim and exercise their rights and how these rights are respected,
protected and fulfilled within the framework of civil society managed local institutions
is not apparent. Changes in the functions and characteristics of CFUGs are
recommended by communities largely according to their well-being status. The most
vulnerable communities were in favor of reform in policies, programs and
governance of local institutions. Conversely, well-off respondents were more
engaged in how local institutions could become more technically competent in
designing coordinating and implementing climate change adaptation programs in the
future.
6. CONCLUSION
The role of CFUGs as local institutions has been explored in terms of the ability to
enable vulnerable communities to adapt when faced with increasing difficulties from
the impacts of climate change. The research revealed that CFUGs were well
established in the research sites and relatively successful in managing local
resources as common property and in reducing collective vulnerability in the context
of climate change. Involvement of CFUGs in designing, implementing and
coordinating climate change adaptation related activities is an additional
responsibility demanded by communities. CFUGs as local institutions are considered
by external agencies to be the most appropriate entry point to access the poor
through pro-poor initiative and hence become partners in adaption programs.
Analysis of institutional capacity and governance of CFUGs from the perspectives of
the most vulnerable was found to be an important consideration when informing
policy and practice. Climate change adaptation in rural and remote hills of Nepal is
occurring, and the roles, responsibilities and challenges of local institutions are
expected to change to meet the expectations. Enhancing understanding knowledge
and skills on impacts of climate vulnerabilities as well as selection and
implementation of appropriate adaptation measures are areas of improvement for
CFUGs. More importantly, how CFUGs improve their internal governance and
delegate authority and power to the most vulnerable and poor will increasingly
challenge the system of governance. Transformation in structure, governance and
the attitudes of decision makers in CFUGs is required to build trust and to equitably
equip most vulnerable communities to enable them in climate change adaptation.
Transformation is also required at agency and government level in the
implementation and monitoring of outcomes of policies and programs to enhance
adaptation amongst the most vulnerable.
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